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THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF USING
OUTCOME STATISTICS
Mark V. Pauly*
INTRODUCTION
The measurement of the outcomes of medical interventions
is obviously a key ingredient in judging the effectiveness of those
interventions. Surprisingly, however, a generally acceptable
technology of measuring outcomes has never been developed. In-
stead, "quality" was traditionally quantified by measuring the
performance of actions hypothesized to cause good outcomes, or
by documenting the presence of structures hypothesized to
cause the good actions that would cause good outcomes.
These halfway measures have increasingly come under criti-
cism and a major effort has begun to measure outcomes as part
of a larger attempt to determine which ways of rendering medi-
cal care really produce good outcomes. Exactly why the develop-
ment of interest in outcomes has been so long in coming is not
generally known. There doubtless are many causes, but surely
one of them has been increasing concern with the cost of medi-
cal services. The cost of a medical service wonderfully focuses
the discussion of the effectiveness of that service which is sup-
posedly justified by the cost. It is probably no coincidence that
the era of cost containment and the era of outcome measure-
ment largely overlap.
When cost becomes an object of concern, agents of all types
have a strong desire to measure the output of those services in
an accurate and valid way. Here, as elsewhere in life, wishing
does not necessarily make it so; the technology of output mea-
surement is a long way from producing that unequivocal out-
come measurement that payers, consumers, regulators, policy-
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makers and providers all crave so strongly.
The imperfection and dissatisfaction with outcome mea-
surement technology are going to be a permanent state of affairs:
there will never be perfect-or even near-perfect-measures of
health outcomes. We may hope for the emergence of ways of
measuring provider-specific outcomes with a reasonable degree
of sensitivity and specificity,1 but unless one uses an elastic defi-
nition of "reasonable," I doubt that this will happen generally.
The lack of a perfect measurement tool does not mean measures
will not be developed for some diagnoses or procedures. Provid-
ers are going to be evaluated on the basis of outcome measures,
but policymakers must cope with the fact that those measures
will necessarily contain substantial imperfections. There will be
a "signal" mixed in with the noise.2 Spending more resources
may raise the signal-to-noise ratio modestly, improving that ra-
tio somewhat over time as new measurement technology be-
comes available. However, outcome measures will always need to
be treated as aids to good guessing, as ways of improving the
odds on a bet about which provider is better. The fundamental
and irreducible uncertainty and imprecision in outcome mea-
surement pose the biggest challenge to public policy.
In the face of this imperfect information, as luck would have
it, some wrenching decisions will have to be made. These deci-
sions involve cost containment to be sure, but they involve more
than platitudes: they involve decisions about the rationing of
care, the denial of benefits and substantial changes in the organ-
ization and structure of the health care system.
This Commentary critiques the myth of perfection in out-
come data that has contributed both to the overselling of the
concept of measuring provider outcomes in some settings and to
a virulent reactive skepticism in others. The Commentary will
also note that the public availability of outcome data is part of a
challenge to some other dearly held myths about the health care
system. Then this Commentary will turn to the question of ap-
propriate public policy responses in the face of essentially im-
perfect data: what mistakes are to be avoided and what goals are
Mark R. Chassin, M.D., M.P.P., M.P.H., Quality of Care: Time To Act, 266 JAMA
3472 (1991).
2 That is, despite the imperfection, there will be valid information contained in the
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to be (realistically) sought? Finally, it will examine the role of
outcome data from a buyer perspective in a market-driven medi-
cal care system.
I. Sohm FALLACIES
A. Perfect Data
Medical outcome data suffer from two kinds of imperfec-
tions. First, the outcomes measured are often incomplete or in-
correctly measured. In-hospital mortality is presumably mea-
sured accurately, but avoidance of death in the hospital is surely
not the primary objective most patients seek. Measurements of
improvement in morbidity status, in functioning and in relief
from pain or disability are all imperfect or incomplete. Measure-
ments of degree of comfort and dignity associated with the
treatment the patient receives barely exist. Second, initial or
present severity is measured imperfectly. To determine whether
care made a patient better, one needs to know both the final
outcome and how sick the patient was before care was initiated.
While there has been some development of measures of "initial
severity," these measures never will capture all important as-
pects of the condition of every patient.3 Many of those aspects
are initially unknown, even to the attending physician. More-
over, the physician will rarely record all the details of the pa-
tient's initial condition or other characteristics that may affect
final outcomes.
'These imperfections mean that a measured outcome for one
hospital which is worse than some others can always be criti-
cized: the provider can argue that "its patients are sicker" and
that "it gets more subtle benefits than are reflected in raw mor-
tality measures." Research suggests that there is some truth to
these claims: some hospitals pinpointed as much worse than av-
erage in the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
mortality data fell back to just worse than average when detailed
initial severity corrections were made."
3 Robert W. Dubois, M.D., Ph.D., Hospital Mortality as an Indicator of Quality, in
PROVIDING QuALrry CA THE CHALLENGE TO CLimcucs 107 (Norbert Goldfield & David
B. Nash eds., 1989).
4 S.D. Horn et al., The Relationship Between Severity of Illness and Hospital
Length of Stay and Mortality, in MEDicAL CARS, April 1991 at 305-17; see also Dubois,
supra note 3, at 122-24 (adjustments in variables from expected death rates when sever-
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Even if reviewers of hospital outcomes could have access to
the same information that the attending physicians had at the
time of treatment, that is, to a complete and augmented medical
record, the issue of "sicker patients" will still not be settled, at
least as far as providers are concerned. An essential feature of
public policy in this area is that outcome measures will be im-
perfect; they will sometimes indicate that a provider is worse
than the provider really is, and sometimes suggest that the pro-
vider is better than the provider really is. Moreover, providers
whose outcomes are worse than average will always disbelieve
their bad records. In this sense, these measures are now and will
remain unfair. Moreover, the search for a reasonably fair and
reasonably accurate measure (depending on how one defines
"reasonably") is bound to end in frustration.
B. Feasible Uniform Quality
If variation in hospital death rates can be linked, even
probabilistically, to something other than variation in initial se-
verity, some of those deaths must be preventable, as Robert Du-
bois has noted.' That is, a given population of patients should
expect to experience, on average, higher death rates in one hos-
pital than in some others. Not all hospitals are equally good.
Not only are some hospitals and doctors more lethal than
others, such differences may not be completely reducible. While
changes in management practices including hiring policies, and
in medical procedures and protocols, may reduce some of the
outcome differences across providers, some differences will re-
main. Some physicians will always be more technically adept,
more perceptive, or just plain smarter than others. Hospital
managers also vary in skill. Not every hospital in town can have
the best management.
Variation in skill or perceptiveness colors how providers in-
terpret outcome data. The hospital or physician whose outcomes
are worse than average will first review the process being used to
provide care. Some deficiencies may be found that will be cor-
rected. However, it is unlikely that quality will be fully brought
up to the norm precisely because poor management often is
ity factored in).
5 Dubois, supra note 3, at 127-28.
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caused by an inability to recognize bad process. That is, if the
providers knew enough to understand (and accept) that their
outcomes truly were inferior, they would have known enough to
avoid those outcomes in the first place. This is why a "self-im-
provement" approach to raising quality will always fall short.
In most industries, variable quality-even when that varia-
tion intrinsically reflects the distribution of talents and motiva-
tions across individuals-is not a cause for concern. Within lim-
its, lower quality care can be provided profitably in a market; it
just sells for a lower price. The lower price in turn simply re-
flects the fact that the premium prices commanded by the best
craftsperson or the best manager do not have to be paid to per-
sons whose skills are average. In health care, however, the myth
of "highest possible quality for all" is challenged by the common
sense observation that it is simply impossible for all patients to
have the highest possible quality. When outcome data did not
exist, and when restrictions on advertising prevented invidious
comparisons, it was possible to pay lip service to the myth that
all doctors are equally good-even though health professionals
knew that this myth was false. The challenge posed by the out-
come movement raises the question of varying quality; some
deaths or bad outcomes, literally speaking, are preventable, but
cannot feasibly be prevented without mass expulsions of physi-
cians and managers from the industry.
C. No Tradeoffs
Suppose, just for the moment, that we could measure out-
comes perfectly. Such technology would be a big help in at-
tempts to determine which care was effective and which was not:
the technology could immediately help to eliminate types of care
that do more harm than good, or that do no good at all, and it
could be used to drive from the market providers unable or un-
willing to provide care of positive net benefit. That is, all "domi-
nated" actions would be eliminated, and only truly effective care
would remain. However, there would still be a decision problem
for buyers and policymakers: how effective must effective care
be to justify its cost? When faced with the option of obtaining
care of unequivocally positive, but small, benefit and high cost,
should the buyer sacrifice the resources? Should public policy
forbid the buyer from sacrificing resources, or require the buyer
to do so? Better information will help make such an option
1992]
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clearer, but it will not make the decision easier.
Let us return to the real world where information about the
effectiveness of care provided by one provider (or one procedure)
relative to another is imperfect. The raw numbers indicate that
A is letter than B, but one's confidence in this judgment is lim-
ited by statistical noise from sampling error and by knowledge
of data imperfections. Of course, if the apparently better pro-
vider is cheaper than the apparently worse provider, there is less
of an argument (although there is still some). Often, the most
expensive hospital or the most expensive treatment is not the
best. But we also know for a certainty that the cheapest hospital
or the cheapest treatment in a town is not the best-but it is the
cheapest. We also know that we will have to make tradeoffs
under conditions of uncertainty. What must be traded off in this
more realistic case is not only quality or good outcomes against
cost, but also the degree of certainty about outcomes against
cost. If the apparently better hospital is much farther away from
home, or much more costly than some other hospital, but if I
cannot tell for sure hove much better it is, or even whether it is
better, I will face a wrenching decision. As the odds that the
hospital is better remain favorable, but decline, when do I de-
cide to take a chance-to gamble that the cheaper or closer hos-
pital is just as good? And, again, should public policy allow me
to bet in any way I wish? This intrinsic tradeoff between uncer-
tainty and "cost" (in monetary, convenience and amenity terms)
is unavoidable, and is at the heart of the policy problem.
II. KEY POLICY QUESTIONS
How then should buyers use the emerging information, and
what should public policy permit? I address five key questions:
1) Is picking the provider or the treatment with the best outcome sta-
tistics always the best bet?
2) What cautions, warnings, or prohibitions should be attached to the
use of such outcome information?
3) Who should (or who should be permitted) to collect, analyze, pub-
lish, and disseminate outcome information?
4) How should employers and health care plans use such
information?
5) How much effort and resources should be put into collecting accu-
rate data?
[Vol. 58:835
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A. Picking Good Providers
A buyer (who could be an individual patient, a benefits
manager, or the medical director of a Health Maintenance Or-
ganization (HMO)) is trying to decide which hospital to use for a
particular condition in a market area with many hospitals. Data
have been collected on some dimensions of the outcomes of
those hospitals. How, if at all, should those data be used?
There are two polar extremes. In Case A, all other informa-
tion, about cost, quality, or uncertainty makes the choice a toss
up; the hospitals are of about the same size, amenity, and conve-
nience. All that is needed is a tie breaker. In Case B, one or the
other provider appears superior on some other dimen-
sion-either cost (to the extent that is relevant), or some other
measure of quality.
In Case A, the almost universal decision rule is obvious:
when everything else is equal, pick the hospital with the best
measured outcomes. The important point is that this rule should
generally be followed regardless of the statistical significance at-
tached to the comparison, and without regard to worries about
the quality of the outcome or severity adjustment measures. Fol-
lowing such a rule means that the technique used both by HCFA
and by some state data agencies in releasing their data-that of
indicating as "significant" only those differences that meet a
0.05 criterion-will be misleading. Only a very conservative
buyer would require that the chances that one hospital is better
than another be greater than 19 in 20 before he or she would
choose it; most buyers would be willing to go with the seller with
the better record even without such strong reassurances.
However sensible this decision rule is for the buyer, the
Case A decision presents problems for sellers: many hospitals (or
physicians) will be shunned whose quality or outcomes, if the
truth could be known, are as good or better than that of their
apparently superior rivals. In this sense, using imperfect data is
unfair to providers. There is some (but not much) consolation in
noting that such imperfection affects firms in all other mar-
kets-the restaurant's chef who is off on the day of the critic's
review, the teacher forced to cope with unruly students and the
business's delivery truck that breaks down through no fault of
its own may also be scored as having lower quality than is the
case. Markets do reward good quality, but only on average. The
myth that "all hospitals and doctors are equally good," pre-
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served by inhibitions of various types on information to buyers,
has protected providers for decades, but is now eroding. The
consequence is that some good but unlucky providers will be
grouped together with the less competent.
The policy question concerns the consequent reorganization
of the industry in which some providers expand and others con-
tract. The expanders, on average, will be of higher quality than
the contractors, but there will be some good quality hospitals
lumped in with the below average. There will be some wasted
motion that will matter little over time, but in the short run will
be of concern.
When would following the "pick the (measured) best rule in
case of ties" be worse than the alternatives of picking the worst
or picking at random? Following the rule would lead to a bad
outcome if there was a negative correlation between measured
outcomes and true quality, that is, if among two apparently sim-
ilar hospitals, the one with the better statistics actually was, on
average, worse than the one with the worse statistics. This possi-
bility should not be ruled out, but is not very likely either.
Case B, in which one provider is apparently superior to an-
other on other grounds, such as on the more traditional mea-
sures of structure or performance, or the basis of convenience or
cost, will require more careful consideration by the buyer of the
significance (statistical and practical) of measured outcome dif-
ferences. Suppose the hospital most convenient to you, associ-
ated with your Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and used
by your favorite doctor, scores very poorly on outcome measures.
The odds that the difference is due to chance alone are a little
greater than one in 20, though no one can tell you the odds that
the difference is due to mismeasurement of initial severity in the
patient population generating the data. What should you do?
The decision theory answer is simple but discomforting: you will
have to form some subjective estimate of the expected utility of
the difference in outcomes and in the other dimensions, and
choose the option with the highest expected utility. Less for-
mally, you will have to decide on the tradeoff and whether the
possible sacrifice in the chances of a good outcome are worth the
savings in convenience cost, in money cost and in sticking with
the doctor. What measures are needed to help you with this de-
cision? Not the kinds of data that agencies typically publish,
represented by tables with asterisks and statistical jargon. But it
(Vol. 68: 36
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is not obvious what represents a superior alternative.
Two policy strategies are worth considering. One represents
an attempt (again) to explain tough choices under risk with im-
perfect data to a reluctant public. "Think of it like Atlantic
City" is actually the best way to inform consumers (and the best
time to explain Medicare mortality statistics might be on the
New Jersey-bound chartered bus). But the political feasibility of
an honest admission of the "good hunch" character of these
choices remains troublesome.
While a frank admission of the risky nature of choice with
outcome data is the best public policy in theory, policymakers in
practice will doubtless find the development of such a policy
challenging if not close to impossible. Government provided data
that only changes the odds a little, but does not point the way to
the unequivocally best (or target the unequivocally worst), will
disappoint voters who would like the government to extract
them from their painful dilemma. At the same time, the truly
good quality provider indicted by a bad measure provided by
the government-even the government agency that qualifies its
numbers-will feel intensely wronged. There is no obvious solu-
tion to this problem. Of course, if outcome data were found to
change buyer choices very little, then the information would not
be worth the trouble. But if buyers do benefit from better
knowledge, then policymakers should be advised to make the
difficult choices.
The other strategy is to try to elicit, at some cost, the atti-
tudes and preferences of a representative sample of buyers of
various types of health care and to use those preferences to con-
struct indicators that are intended to replicate their choices.0
Such a "ratings" approach will never be perfect, but it may be
the best we can do.
B. Cautions, Prohibitions, and Warnings
I have already described the complex and dangerous nature
of the choices that would need to be made as a result of outcome
data. Providers live in mortal fear that these measures will be
"misused." The next issue is what misuse means, how it can be
6 We are engaged in such an activity at the University of Pennsylvania for corporate
benefits managers and medical directors, and are extending our efforts to union health
plans.
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prevented and whether it should be prevented.
The premise for this discussion has already been presented:
using outcome data, either of the kind presently available or of
the best kind we are very likely to get, will be difficult. Avoiding
mistakes will be impossible and some understanding of how to
interpret statistics will be necessary even to limit mistakes.
How should government (which itself is the source of many
of the measures) behave? The safest course of action for the gov-
ernment is obviously to surround the data with a protective coat
of qualifications and limitations. State data agencies have taken
quite different approaches here: some go for a caveat emptor
strategy, while others require, like a parent toward a child's po-
tential escort, a much more explicit statement of intentions. A
strategy of providing raw data with no help does not seem ap-
propriate, but it is far from clear what sort of qualifications
should be added. This is a new situation and we may well need
to try some alternatives to see how buyers behave (and what
they like best).
If such a situation were costless, there would obviously be
no reason to oppose government provision of as much help as
possible to interpret the data. In the real world, beyond requir-
ing some basic cautions, there does not appear to be much gov-
ernment can or should do. The reason for this skepticism is that
there will be a wide variety of potential uses for, and users of,
the data. As already noted, the super-cautious approach to
avoiding one type of error, that necessarily increases the likeli-
hood of another type of error, is not what many buyers will
want. If all buyers or users of the data had the same attitude
toward risk, the same valuation of different dimensions of out-
comes, and the same willingness to balance medical outcomes
against cost or convenience, one might, after considerable effort,
be able to develop a protocol or guide for use of the data. How-
ever, such uniformity does not generally exist and so the best
action for government is to ensure that available data are as ac-
curate as possible under the circumstances.
But is it not possible that consumers, patients or corporate
buyers will make mistakes, where a mistake is defined as choos-
ing a hospital that truly is lower quality than some other hospi-
tal? Would not a careful analysis of the use of outcome data
compare the harms that arise from such mistakes with the po-
tential gains in terms of better choices by others or greater effi-
[Vol. 58:35
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ciency? The answer would appear to be affirmative, but there is
an important paradox. There is not likely to be an external gold
standard measure by which one hospital is definitely and defini-
tively judged to be better or worse than another. If there were,
the information used to generate that conclusion should itself be
conveyed explicitly to consumers, patients and corporate buyers.
Then, except for careless errors, the public should not make mis-
takes. The only mistake one can make using imperfect data is to
rely on that data alone and ignore other ancillary information
which, when combined with the data, will generate a reliable
measure of quality. But then the solution is not to suppress the
imperfect outcome data, but to combine them with the addi-
tional information that does lead to a correct conclusion.
We have the potential of observing a natural experiment in
a new kind of market-the market for data interpretation. Both
buyers and sellers of services have already put effort into assem-
bling and trying to make sense of data and there is a potentially
important service to be performed in collection, collation and in-
terpretation of such information. So long as false and incorrect
data are forbidden (as they should be), the further interpreta-
tion of the data will be a service for which a reasonably func-
tioning market should emerge. At least, there seem to be no ob-
vious impediments to such a market.
There is another possible consequence of imperfect provider
specific data that might provoke a strategic buyer response. To
the extent that providers have the power, they may try to avoid
caring for patients who are suspected to be "sicker than aver-
age" in ways that are not taken into account by the outcome
reporting system. Whether this behavior will be important is an
open question. For instance, hospitals do not appear to have se-
lected more profitable admissions to any great extent under
Medicare. However, if some hospitals or doctors do channel
sicker patients to other providers, one would expect sophisti-
cated buyers to adjust for this behavior in their evaluations of
outcome data. If private hospitals send sicker patients to munic-
ipal hospitals, this will make outcomes look better for the former
and worse for the latter. Buyers should be able to detect this
behavior and therefore will be less inclined to take some of the
differences into account.
The main adverse consequence of imperfect outcome data
in such a scenario will therefore be the channeling of patients to
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providers who are not the most appropriate or the most conven-
ient. Moreover, not all buyers will be sophisticated. Again, until
we have more experience with outcome data, we do not know
how severe a problem such sorting will pose.
A major purpose of providing outcome data is to allow buy-
ers to make choices among sellers. The power to make choices is
the opportunity to make mistakes and some errors are
inevitable.
C. Who Should Collect, Publish and Analyze Data?
Information of all types is what economists call a "public
good"-a good that a competitive market will supply in suffi-
ciently small amounts because of the potential for free riding on
others' efforts. Labeling a service a public good does not neces-
sarily mean that a public entity needs to produce it, but it does
mean that a legal requirement may be needed to provide data,
and that some publicly financed subsidy for the collection and
compilation of that data is justified.
In contrast to the need for an explicit public role in the col-
lection of data, dissemination is a more complicated question.
One issue is how the cost of disseminating information in some
way varies with the number of users. On the one hand, if the
cost is approximately proportionate to use, there is no need for
public involvement. On the other hand, simple publication of
the data might involve a single lump sum cost, with little addi-
tional cost for a user to be made aware of the results. In this
case, some public role might be appropriate.
Analysis-the step between compilation and publica-
tion-poses more complex problems. One solution is a "two-
track" strategy: publication of simple measures at public ex-
pense, and more complex analyses at private expense, especially
for users who have special needs or desires. There is another
loop in the process, however. How is a buyer of information to
know which private seller is furnishing the best method of anal-
ysis? While there is in principle a need for "information about
information" that might have some "public good" characteris-
tics, the role appears to be minor. Seemingly a competitive pro-
cess to supply information and analysis in various forms is both
feasible and desirable. The likely structure of such an informa-
tion industry is still a puzzle at the moment: entry appears easy,
especially if the raw public data are made available at nominal
[Vol. 58:35
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cost as they should be. Some firms might be able to develop spe-
cial skills, but in general the market appears likely to remain
both competitive and efficient.
D. The Use of Information by Third Parties
Use of information by the individual patient raises the is-
sues of understanding and data availability. What about the use
of information on outcomes by third party payers or by agents
of those payers? Public insurers, private commercial insurers
and the benefits departments of self-insured firms may all be
interested in outcome measures for different providers. Such in-
surers may want this information either because they themselves
intend to contract selectively with some providers, or because
they want to be able to evaluate HMO and PPO arrangements
that involve selective contracting. What motives would they be
expected to bring to the use of data and should special limits or
encouragements exist for them?
There is an important difference between such third parties
and individual patients. Third parties are presumably interested
in outcomes for populations of patients, while the individual pa-
tient cares only about the outcome for himself or herself. At a
minimum, a third party may face a different kind of tradeoff,
since a hospital that is best for one condition may not be best
for all, but concentration of business may be necessary to get the
most advantageous price. Moreover, the uncertainty about an
outcome that might be large if applied to a single individual may
average out in the experience of a reasonably large population of
insureds.
The most serious puzzle about such third parties, however,
is the question of their objectives. There is no doubt that some
workers and unions fear the uses that their employers and insur-
ers might make of outcome and cost data. On the other hand,
employers might reasonably be expected to have as their objec-
tive the choice of arrangements that maximize benefits to em-
ployees, given the cost. After all, only Hawaiian employers are
obligated to offer health benefits.7 Employers presumably pro-
Timothy Egan, Hawaii Shows It Can Offer Health Insurance For All, N.Y. TuEs,
July 23, 1991, at Al. Hawaii is the only state to have near-univeral health care. The
program, initiated in 1974, requires employers to pay the cost of insurance premiums for
any person working over 20 hours a week. The employee pays no more than 1.5% of
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vide health benefits to attract and retain good workers at moder-
ate wages.
At a minimum, employees would need to know what objec-
tives are being pursued on their behalf. Theory suggests that
health insurance benefits, which are offered to make working for
a firm more attractive to the labor market, should be managed
by firms to benefit employees; benefits managers ought to care
about quality and outcomes as well as costs. Many do, but there
is a potential danger for those employees that an employer is not
trying to attract or retain. Some firms may not have a strong
incentive to pay attention to outcomes, such as the company
that is cutting back, the firm where benefits were extracted by
unions and the corporation with employees in positions it wants
to phase out.
E. How Much Data?
As in all other matters, spending more resources will, even-
tually, produce better results-in this case, better outcome mea-
sures. The key policy question is how good the outcome data
need to be. The answer to that question depends, in turn, on the
prior question of how the data are to be used.
For internal management of hospitals and other providers,
the need for precision is likely to be different than for external
valuation purposes. All judgments here are somewhat tentative,
but I would speculate that internal management can proceed
with data of poorer quality than can external valuation. Internal
management, after all, collects much more data than simple out-
come measures and obtains much more subjective information
about performance. Outcome data are likely to be quite unsuited
for internal management. One reason is that most of the out-
comes measured in data sets that are comparable across hospi-
tals are measures of serious adverse events vhich, thankfully,
are rare, even for seriously ill patients: mortality, major morbid-
ity, iatrogenic complications and readmissions for the same con-
dition. The low frequency of these events means that the sample
sizes at the level of the hospital floor, the physician or the short
time period are generally too small to permit useful statistical
gross wages or the premium, whichever is less. Id. In 1990 Hawaii added the State
Health Insurance Program that provides limited coverage to the 5% of the population
not covered under the 1974 plan. Id.
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comparisons. Since internal management also relies on analyzing
variations within different parts of an organization, the parts
need to be small enough to permit a sufficient number of com-
parisons-but then the sample sizes of patients are usually too
small to permit the comparisons to have any strong statistical
meaning. These observations suggest that outcome measures of
the sort that public agencies collect may not be effectively used
for internal management purposes. Instead, measures of process
and the more frequently available measures of consumer satis-
faction are likely to be used.
At the level of external purchasers, however, sample sizes
may be large enough to generate sufficient statistical power for
meaningful comparisons. The individual hospital cannot very ef-
fectively compare itself with other hospitals, but buyers can
make that comparison. Buyers are also likely to lack the internal
knowledge of process, of attitudes and of competence that man-
agement possesses. This means that valid external comparisons
will be much more sensitive to imprecision of measurements, es-
pecially of initial severity. Moreover, most of the research activ-
ity in the next few years will be in the development of improved
versions of severity measures. The key market question, how-
ever, is how much such refined measures are going to be worth
to buyers.
For some buyers (with hope a small minority) there may be
little interest in such information. Some benefits managers
would find their lives a lot simpler if they could conclude that all
hospitals in a town were equally good. Then they could just con-
tract with the cheapest. While such an attitude is shortsighted,
long-term vision in health care cost growth is a scarce
commodity.
The most fundamental question is: what is it worth to a
buyer to avoid a small mistake? In general, this value will be
low: subtle unmeasured variations in initial severity mean that
one might pick the second best hospital in town rather than the
best, but to the buyer the difference is likely to be of little im-
portance. There is a kind of Catch 22 here. One is only likely to
suspect that more precise measurements of initial severity will
make a major difference among hospitals where there are al-
ready obvious indicators of variations in unmeasured severity.
While subtle differences will not matter much to buyers,
they may well matter to sellers. The best hospital that would
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lose to the second best hospital which is almost as good has an
incentive to make the truth known.
III. OUTCOME DATA AND THE MEDICAL ECONOMY
The key policy issue is not the quality or accuracy of the
outcome measures to be developed. Some measures will eventu-
ally be developed, even though they will never be perfect. The
key policy issue is how those measures will be used. Use, in turn,
depends in large part on the rest of the delivery and financing
system structure. I want to outline some thoughts on the likely
use of outcome data in a competitive, market-based medical care
delivery system and comment on the use of such data in a more
centrally regulated system.
The ideal of competition involves much more than multiple
producers of care trying to attract patients. Decades of evidence
proves that competition alone, in the face of distorted incentives
and imperfect information, will not produce an outcome that
will make people happy. The ideal of a competitive market, as
outlined by Enthoven, involves more than just many sellers.8
Such a market also involves knowledgeable buyers facing proper
financial incentives. There is, it must be admitted, considerable
debate, even among the proponents of competitive systems,
about how they should be structured. There is general agree-
ment, however, that buyers need to be conscious of both cost
and quality as measured by outcomes.
Cost-quality consciousness is expected to produce three re-
sults, one much more emphasized and the other two less so. The
most emphasized result is that competition, combined with cost-
quality consciousness, should eliminate pure waste-where
waste is defined as costly activities that do not yield any positive
benefit. The reasoning is obvious: buyers always seek to avoid
sellers who charge them more for the same outcomes as other
sellers, or who give them inferior outcomes for the same price.
With good outcome and cost data, and the option of choosing
among a number of sellers, buyers will pick the seller with the
least waste. Sellers who want to maximize profits, or who just
want to survive financially, will find it in their interest to elimi-
8 ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING
COST OF MEDICAL CARE 70-92 (1980).
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nate waste. Overly costly ways of producing particular services
and the supply of services that are costly but yield no benefit,
will both be avoided.
A second result is more .subtle: once the actions that are
costly but yield no benefit are eliminated, buyers will need to
compare the magnitude of services with positive benefits with
their costs to judge whether the benefits are worth the cost. This
choice will be difficult. It is not helpful to try to disguise the
necessity of making this choice by trying to distinguish between
services with "significant" or "more than marginal" benefits and
other services. The key question is how large does the benefit
have to be before it becomes significant. David C. Hadorn and
Robert H. Brook try to capture this idea by distinguishing be-
tween effective care and "necessary" care, with necessary care
(apparently) defined as care clearly demonstrated to provide
"significant" net benefit.' But other than tossing the question
back to panels of supposed experts, these researchers provide no
basis for distinguishing between "significant" positive net bene-
fits and net benefits that are positive but "non-significant."' 
The main point is that the emergence of accepted outcome
measures will add a special urgency to the need to develop some
way of making this tradeoff along the (almost) "flat of the
curve." As long as the connection between care and outcomes is
sufficiently vague, one can always pretend that some costly type
of care is not "clearly" demonstrated to be effective and so
might be ineffective. Better outcome measures and better link-
ing of these measures to clinical actions will mean that the
vagueness dodge will no longer work. But then we will be face-
to-face with the policy question we all try hard to avoid: how do
we say to someone, even to ourselves, that it is better to forego
beneficial care because the care is not worth the cost in terms of
non-medical goods and services that will have to be sacrificed?
The rising costs of medical care alone are pushing us willy-
nilly toward having to confront the issue of rationing. When we
do confront the rationing issue, outcome measures will be key.
There is a real chance of backlash. The easiest way to avoid the
difficult task of denying effective but costly care is to allege that
9 David C. Hadorn, M.D., M.A. & Robert H. Brook, M.D., Sc.D., The Health Care
Resource Allocation: Defining Our Terms, 266 JAMA 3328, 3330 (Dec. 18, 1991).
10 Id. at 3329-30.
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the data on effectiveness are no good. Most probably we will
have to find a discourse that makes us comfortable with ration-
ing-a discourse we have yet to find-before we can fully accept
the use of outcome measures in that process.11 We can see some
of the alternatives in the discussion of Oregon Medicaid and the
tendency of policymakers to fall back on opinions on what kinds
of care are "good," regardless of outcome evidence.12
The third difficult response to outcome data in a market
setting will arise as markets do what they do best-cater to the
diverse preferences of different buyers. It seems plausible that
different consumers would want to make different choices in the
cost-outcome tradeoff just described. To make those choices cor-
rectly-for example, to judge whether it is worth it to travel a
longer distance, or pay more, to use a provider with better out-
comes-the buyer will need to have information on outcomes.
While I have in another setting advocated publicly financed as-
sistance to enhance the ability of low income consumers to buy
higher quality care, there will still be some residual variation,
probably related to income, in the .quality of care different con-
sumers receive.'" Better outcome data will document this "ineq-
uity," but will also facilitate such inequality. Here again, there is
a real chance that the outcome measure will itself be blamed or
criticized.
If different buyers do want different outcomes, the notion of
a single set of standards or protocols for appropriate care will be
challenged. Outcome measures may never become discriminating
enough to define multiple guidelines, such as a high quality and
11 Id. at 3328-29
12 Oregon, in an attempt to extend Medicaid coverage to 120,000 poor citizens below
the poverty level not currently eligible for coverage, planned to ration health services.
State planners ranked 709 medical treatments in order of usefulness and cost and then
estimated Medicaid could only provide coverage for the first 587. Michael Abramowitz,
Quashing the Oregon Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1992, at 27; Robert Pear, Oregon's
Experiment; Federal Rejection Blocks Health Care Rationing Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1992, at A2. The conditions not covered include liver transplants for alcoholics and non-
traditional measures to save low birthweight babies. Neal R. Peirce, 'AmBush' May Chill
Health-Care Reform, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 10, 1992, at A14. The plan was rejected by
Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis W. Sullivan as violative of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, as by definition, people with serious chronic illnesses are consid-
ered "disabled." Michael Abramowitz, Quashing the Oregon Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
1992, at 27.
13 Mark V. Pauly et al., A Plan for 'Responsible National Health Insurance,' 10
Health Affairs 5 (Part 1, Spring 1991).
[Vol, 58:35
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
a not-so-high quality set of guidelines. But if such distinctions
become possible, then the outcome measures that support them
will come under more intense scrutiny.
Regulatory approaches to controlling costs and maintaining
quality will almost surely not tolerate such diversity in either
process or outcome. The difficult tradeoffs will still have to be
made, however, and the regulator faced with accurate outcome
data which show that some hospitals or doctors do not perform
as well as others will be faced with a difficult choice: what does
one say about the hospital that does not achieve as good an out-
come as some other hospitals but is the only one convenient to a
particular community? The outcome measures themselves will
come under fire once they are taken seriously.
CONCLUSION
I have not dealt with the question of whether consumers,
patients or corporate buyers can be trusted to use outcome mea-
sures, or whether they should be prevented from doing so. That
is because, in my view, there is little chance of returning to the
era in which "authorities" were trusted to assure medical ser-
vices quality. In the role of consumer, or in the role of voter,
citizens will be making choices based on outcomes.
1992]

